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Summary 
A Roman pater familias was entitled to the following positive rights: ius vitae ac necis, ius 
exponendi, ius vendendi and ius noxae dedendi. What follows is an in-depth analysis of the 
changes in ius vitae ac necis and ius exponendi. Ius vitae ac necis denotes right of disposal 
over the life and death of a filius/filia familias, while ius exponendi the right to expose 
newborn infants. Exposing a child often contained its death or wilful murder; e.g., in case of a 
deformed child when the aim was to get the family or the community rid of prodigium 
representing ill luck. Therefore, it seems to be more proper to discuss the rights a father had 
against newborn infants—no matter if they applied to killing or only exposing the child—as 
part of ius exponendi since killing or exposing children was several times limited and 
sanctioned in a single imperial decree. Originally, ius vitae ac necis was sacral and punitive 
law power. Its sacral character came to the front when killing a deformed child since this right 
is the component of the father’s power over his newborn infant, and this will be discussed 
under the heading ius exponendi; its punitive law aspect will become obvious when it is used 
against an adult child. This paper, first, intends to describe changes in us vitae ac necis, and 
dwell on the restrictions and rules of procedure of xercising it (I.). After that, changes in ius 
exponendi will be followed up, with special regard to the regulation of the legal status of the 
exposed child (II.). 
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In Roman law potestas always denotes some power; plena in re potestas is full power of the 
owner of the thing over the thing, by which ”in his own property everybody can do everything 
that does not disturb others”.1 Pater familias was entitled to patria potestas over his children 
and dominica potestas over his slaves.2 Patria potestas, just as power over one’s wife, manus, 
comes from the same full-scope power of the head of the amily. This power is total: on the 
one hand, because free family members, slaves and lifeless things are all subjected to it; on 
the other hand, because it contains the right to destroy things and kill the above mentioned 
persons.3 Consequently, the power over persons and things the head of the family was entitled 
to (potestas, manus, mancipium, dominium) developed from the same ancient power, none of 
the formations of power served as an example for the other4, which clearly refutes 
Mommsen’s view that the father had ownership over his c ildren.5 According to Ulpian, pater 
                                                 
1 Ulp. D. 8, 5, 8, 5. 
2 Paul. D. 50, 16, 215. ’Potestatis’ verbo plura significantur: In persona magistratuum imperium: in persona 
liberorum patria potestas: in persona servi dominium. 
3 Kaser, Max: Der Inhalt der patria potestas. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, 
Romanistische Abteilung 83. 1971. pp. 62–87., 62. 
4 Kaser 1971. p. 63. In Warheit beruht die Gleichartigkeit der Gewalten über die Personen und über die Sachen 
nur darauf, daß sie beide, auch noch lange Zeit nach ihrer Ablösung aus der einheitlichen Urgewalt, gleich total 
geblieben sind. Keine hat der anderen zum Vorbild ge ient, sondern beide sind ebenso ursprünglich, wie die 
Teilung einer Sache in einheitliche Teile den Teilstücken im gleichen Augenblick ein selbstandiges Dasein 
verleiht. 
5 Mommsen, Theodor: Römisches Strafrecht. Leipzig 1899. p. 17., 20. 
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familias is the one who is entitled to dominion in his house.6 (Domus is also a sacral concept, 
which had its own household gods (dii penates).7  
It is well known that according to Roman law certain persons have rights of their own, such as 
the pater familias, others are under power, such as the wife (uxor in manu), the person in 
mancipium and the family child under patria potestas.8 Several descriptions of patria potestas 
can be found in the sources of Roman law, e.g. in Institutiones of Gaius9 and Iustian.10 Almost 
surprised, Gaius notes that such an extended father’s power does not exist anywhere else, 
perhaps only among the Galatas. (He is presumably wrong on this point since we have 
information on similar extensive potestas in the Antiquity among the Celts in Gaul11, as it is 
described by Caesar.12) Although several presentations of patria potestas can be found in the 
sources, it was not defined uniformly. Presumably, they considered it unnecessary to 
determine it exhaustively since patria potestas was clearly the product of the Roman spirit, 
and it owed its existence not to the State’s lawmaking as it went back to times long before the 
State.13 Only sui iuris citizens with full right could be patres familias14, all the persons were 
under patria potestas over whom the pater familias exercised his rights not due to d minica 
potestas or manus: children begotten in lawful marriage15, adopted children16, legitimated 
children, wives of blood children and adopted children (in case of manus marriage), if their 
father was under patria potestas, grandchildren, great-grandchildren etc. and their wives (in 
case of manus marriage).17 In Watson’s definition, patria potestas meant the power that in 
Roman society the male head of the family was entitl d o over the free family members 
subordinated to him (apart from the wife, who was under manus).18  
Pater familias was entitled to the following rights: ius vitae ac necis, ius exponendi, ius 
vendendi and ius noxae dedendi.19 What follows is an in-depth analysis of the changes in ius 
vitae ac necis and ius exponendi.  
                                                 
6 Ulp. D. 50, 16, 195, 2. Paterfamilias est, qui in domo dominium habet. 
7 Cic. dom. 41. Quid est sanctius, quid omni religione munitius quam Domus unus cuiusque civium. Hic arae 
sunt, hic foci, hic dii penates, hic sacra religiones ceremoniae continentur. Hoc profugium est ita sanctum, ut 
inde abripi neminem fas sit. 
8 Inst. 1, 8. 
9 Gai. inst. 1, 55. Item in potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri quos iutis nuptiis procreavimus. Quod ius proprium 
civium Romanorum est; fere enim nulli alii sunt homines qui talem in filios suos habent potestatem, qualem nos 
habemus. Idque divus Hadrianus edicto, quod proposuit de his qui sibi liberisque suis ab eo civitatem Romanam 
petebant, significavit. Nec me praeterit Galatarum gentem credere in potestate parentum liberos esse. 
10 Inst. 1, 9. In potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri, quos ex iustis nuptiis procreaverimus. Nuptiae autem sive 
matrimonium est viri et mulieris coniunctio individuam consuetudinem vitae continens. Ius autem potestatis, 
quod in liberos habemus, proprium est civium Romanorum: nulli enim alii sunt homines, qui talem in liberos 
habeant potestatem, qualem nos habemus. Qui igitur ex te et uxore tua nascitur, in tua potestate est: item qui ex 
filio tuo et uxore eius nascitur, id est nepos tuus et neptis, aeque in tua potestate, et pronepos et proneptis et 
deinceps ceteri, qui tamen ex filis tua nascitur, in tua potestate non est, sed in patris eius.  
11 Mitteis, Ludwig: Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs. Leipzig 
1891. p. 24. 
12 Caes. Gall. 4, 19, 3–4. Viri in uxores sicuti in liberos vitae necisque habent potestatem, et cum pater familiae 
inlustiore loco natus decessit, eius propinqui conveniunt et de morte, si res in suspicionem venit, de uxoribus in 
servilem modum quaestionem habent, et si conpertum est, igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas interficiunt. 
… omnia quaeque vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia ac paulo supra hanc 
memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab iis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur. 
13 Pólay, Elemér: Az atyai hatalom intézményének alapvonalai a római jogban. (Principles of patria potestas in 
Roman Law) Miskolc 1940. p. 7. 
14 Inst. 1, 9, 1–2. 
15 Gai. inst. 1, 55. 
16 Gai. inst. 1, 97. 
17 Pólay 1940. 14. 
18 Watson, Alan: The Law of Persons in the Late Roman Republic. Oxford 1967. p. 77. 
19 Nótári, Tamás: Római köz- és magánjog. (Roman Public and Private Law) Szeged 2011. p. 176
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I.  In Antique sources several references can be found to ius vitae ac necis that constituted an 
essential element of the potestas of the pater familias.20 One of the royal laws left to us by 
Dionysius of Halicarnass under the name of Romulus regulates the father’s punitive power 
over his adult child. According to it, the father was entitled to full-scope power over his son 
during the son’s whole lifetime, he was allowed to restrict his personal freedom, beat him, 
exile him in handcuffs to do rural work, and kill him; thus, the source, listing the canon of 
punishments that could be imposed, refers to the possibility of exercising ius vitae ac necis 
almost as ultima ratio.21 Although the law does not say anything on either the scope of 
application of these punishments or the procedure necessary for imposing them, it can be 
made probable that the family child was not at the mercy of the father, if we consider the strict 
control that the gens exercised initially over the internal life of the family and which was later 
assumed by the censor.22 We know from Dionysius that censores controlled how the pater 
familias brought up their children and if they deemed upbringing too strict or too mild, they 
took firm measures; they acted similarly with regard to disciplining slaves.23 Presumably, 
censores also took care to ensure that the religious cult of the house community was properly 
fulfilled.24 By clear irony, Plutarch notes that censores did not leave either marriage or 
upbringing of children or feasts without control, instead they exercised supervision over 
everybody’s conduct of life and political thinking.25 
The first proof of the restrictions of exercising ius vitae ac necis, which constituted the 
content of patria potestas, is provided by the stipulation of the Twelve Table Law that can be 
more or less safely reconstructed from the Gaius text of Codex Veronensis and from 
Fragmentum Augustoduniense: ”Ergo tum praetor corpus te dedere dom …………… 
parentem putes …… iure uti t……………<do> mino vel parenti tiam occidere eum et 
mortuum dedere in no<xam> ………… ………… patria potestas potest. n ………… cum patris 
potestas talis est ut habeat vitae et necis po<testa m>. De filio hoc tractari crudele est, 
sed… non est. … n post r…. <occi>dere sine iusta causa, ut constituit lex XII tabularum, sed 
deferre iu<dici> debet propter calumniam.26  Fragmentum Augustoduniense discusses the 
power of pater familias that gives him the right to kill the slave or family child who has 
caused damage to a third party delictually, and to fulfil the obligation of noxae deditio by 
handing over the corpse or a part thereof. Directly after that, it clearly states that patria 
potestas contains ius vitae ac necis, and that in accordance with the provisions of the Twelve 
Table Law the pater familias was not allowed to kill his son sine iusta causa. Krüger’s 
reading of the text is not completely certain, however, in spite of these changes it is possible 
to read the phrase without any doubt <occi>dere sine iusta causa, ut constituit lex XII 
tabularum, i.e., that in accordance with the provisions of the Twelve Table Law the pater 
familias was not allowed to kill his son without iusta causa. The authenticity of the quotation 
would be doubtful if it should or could be presumed that this is only an independent insertion 
of the jurist who compiled Fragmentum Augustoduniense from Gaius’s texts. However, in the 
present case rather fragmentary text of Codex Veronensis contains the ”…tabul…” 
                                                 
20 Cic. dom. 29. 77; Pis 40. 97; fin 1, 8; rep 2, 35; Val. Max. 5, 8, 2-5, 9, 1; 5, 10, 1; 6, 1, 6; Suet. Tib. 35; Liv. 1, 
26; 2, 41; 8, 7; epit. 54; Plin. nat. 34, 4, 16; Auct. ad Her. 4, 16, 23; Sall. Cat. 39, 5; 52, 30; Sen. clem. 1, 11. 50; 
Quint. decl. 317; Dio Cass. 37, 36; Gell. 5, 19, 9. 
21 Dion. Hal. 2, 26, 4. 
22 Liv. 6, 20; Gell. 9, 2. 
23 Dion. Hal. 20, 13, 3. 
24 Pólay, Elemér: A censori regimen morum és az ún. házibíráskodás. (Regimen morum of the censors and the so 
called iudicium domesticum) Acta Universitatis Szegediensis XII. 1965. p. 5. 
25 Plut. Cato mai. 16. 
26 Fragmentum Augustoduniense 85–86. In: Collectio librorum iuris anteiustiniani. Edd. P. Krüger–Th. 
Mommsen–G. Studemund. Berolini 1923. p. 160. 
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fragment27, which can mean nothing else than leges XII tabularum, which makes it highly 
probable that this provision from the Twelve Table Law was contained in the original Gaius 
text too.28 Kunkel claims that originally iusta causa meant that it was mandatory to prove that 
the son had committed a crime which made it lawful to apply death penalty.29 Presumably, 
demonstration had a determined order where, after the case had been accurately described and 
investigated, the family child charged with committing the crime was given the opportunity to 
defend himself. This is also implied by the phrases found in the cases to be discussed later 
cognita domi causa30, inspecta diligentissime causa31, audita causa and quae adulescens pro 
se dixerat32. 
The fragment deferre iu<……..> debet propter calumniam was read by its first publisher, 
Chatelain as hoc, which was borrowed from him by Krüger too. First, Ferrini and Scialoja 
read and supplemented it to iu<dici> , which version was soon shared by Krüger too. 
However, as it has been proved by Kunkel33, the iu<dici>  reading is not acceptable either in 
terms of content or textual criticism. Namely, if the translation of deferre iudici is “beim 
Richter Anklage erheben” or “dem Richter anzeigen”, then, by interpreting iudex as a body of 
administration of justice (öffentliche Justiz), two opportunities are offered. Either the pater 
familias shall bring a charge against his son before the law to avoid calumnia; but this 
interpretation would fundamentally question the existence or exercisability of ius vitae ac 
necis, which constitutes a cardinal point of patria potestas. Or the pater familias had to report 
to the iudex the killing carried out by him owing to the ius vitae ac necis he was entitled to, 
and in this case it is difficult to harmonise a mere obligation to report with the prohibition of 
killing of the filius familias sine iusta causa. If we accept the reading iu<……> as proper, the 
addition iu<dici>  cannot satisfy us because it does not fill up the lacuna present in the text. 
Namely, the edge of the page was cut off in equal width in order to use it again, so, at least 
seven-eight—and not four—letters are missing from each line; consequently, the addition 
iu<dicibus> instead of iu<dici>  seems to be more acceptable. This reading will give sense if 
we interpret iudices not as judges of administration of justice but membrs of the consilium, 
the relatives and friends. At the same time, it is also possible that the reading iu<……> not 
having been confirmed can be replaced by nec<essariis> or pro<pinquis>. As the reading of 
the text raises serious problems, it should not be considered a proof beyond any doubt of the 
absolute necessity of consilium necessariorum, yet, from the above it is absolutely clear that 
in order to exercise ius vitae ac necis the crime of the filius had to be proved (iusta causa), if 
the father wanted to avoid the charge of murder. At the same time, other sources provide 
convincing proofs that to exercise ius vitae ac necis it was necessary to hold iudicium 
domesticum and to convene the consilium necessariorum: ”Maiores nostri dominum patrem 
familias appellaverunt, honores in domo gerere, ius dicere, permiserunt et domum pusillam 
rem publicam esse iudicaverunt.” 34 Seneca, in his letter to Lucilius, mentions that the 
ancestors made it possible for the dominus, i.e., the pater familias to fulfil offices in the house 
community and exercise iurisdictio, thus, they considered the home or house community a 
reduced-sized copy of the State. The dominus, exercising punitive power, acted in compliance 
                                                 
27 Gai. inst. 4, 80. 
28 Rabello, Alfredo Mordechai: Effetti personali della „patria potestas”. Milano 1979. p. 90; Visscher, 
Ferdinand de: Le régime romain de la noxalité. Bruxelles 1947. p. 175; Kunkel, Wolfgang: Das Konsilium im 
Hausgericht. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 83. 1966. pp. 219–
251., 243. 
29 Kunkel 1966. p. 243. 
30 Liv. 2, 41, 10. 
31 Val. Max. 9, 5, 1. 
32 Sen. clem. 1, 15, 3. 
33 Kunkel 1966. p. 244. 
34 Sen. epist. 47, 14. 
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with exemplum maiorum35 and priscum institutum according to Tacitus;36 in compliance with 
mos maiorum according to Sueton;37 and in compliance with consuetudo according to 
Cicero38. The iudicium took place, within certain formalities, usually in the atrium of the 
home of the pater familias.39 
With regard to the question whether iudicium domesticum was real jurisdiction, the literature 
is rather divided. The view that does not acknowledge iudicium domesticum as real 
jurisdiction can be traced back to Mommsen.40 He refuses the concept of iudicium 
domesticum for being an oxymoron, and speaks about Hauszucht only, which can be called 
coercitio or disciplina too; so, iudicium domesticum, that is, according to him Hauszucht is 
nothing else than a sort of a Gewissensgericht.41 Following Mommsen, Volterra claims that 
the judgment of the iudicium domesticum did not exempt the person under power from the 
State’s court proceedings and the punishment imposed by it42, and that the existence of State’s 
court set up for judging the crime excludes the exist nce of iudicium domesticum as a legal 
institution.43 Guided by a similar thought, Mommsen also misses th  accurate description of 
the scope of crimes to be judged by iudicium domesticum.44 According to Kunkel’s opinion, 
this way of thinking was not typical of the Romans as scopes of authority overlapped in the 
order of the state administration of justice too, which also proves that the competence of the 
courts of justices ordered to judge determined crimes had never become exclusive, between 
domestic jurisdiction and the State’s administration of justice, and while they existed side by 
side a mutual competition of competencies prevailed b tween them.45 (A similar situation 
evolved between the tresviri capitales and the quaestiones perpetuae46, and due to certain 
crimes it was possible to bring a charge before the quaestio repetundarum, the quaestio 
maiestatis or the quaestio de vi too.47) Kaser—although he does not resolutely refuse to give
any significance to iudicium domesticum as Mommsen and Volterra—emphasises that it did 
not belong to the scope of ius.48 Iudicium domesticum is considered real jurisdiction by those 
who more or less share Geib’s opinion, as Geib claims that the pater familias was entitled to 
the right of punitive jurisdiction over the members of his family.49 Romans considered the 
family a reduced-sized copy of the State, in which pater familias can be made equal to 
magistratus having imperium, and similarly their iudisdicto can be made parallel too50, as 
                                                 
35 Tac. ann. 2, 50. Adulterii graviorem poenam deprecatus, ut exemplo maiorum propinquis suis ultra 
ducentesimum lapidem removeretur suasit. 
36 Tac. ann. 13, 32. Isque prisco instituto propinquis coram de capite famaque coniugis cognovit et insontem 
nuntiavit. 
37 Sue. Tib. 35. ut propinqui more maiorum de communi sententia coerer nt 
38 Cic. Rosc. Am. 15, 44. Quod consuetudine patres faciunt, id quasi novum reprehendis… 
39 Val. Max 5, 8, 3. Succurrebant effigies maiorum cum titulis suis ut eorum virtutes posteri non solum legerent, 
sed etiam immittarentur. 
40 Mommsen 1899. pp. 16-26. 
41 Mommsen 1899. p. 17. 
42 Volterra, Edoardo: Il preteso tribunale domestico in diritto romano. RISG 85. 1948. pp. 103–153., 117. 
43 Volterra 1948. pp. 135. ff. 
44 Mommsen 1899. p. 20. 
45 Kunkel 1966. p. 222. 
46 Kunkel, Wolfgang: Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des römischen Kriminalverfahrens in vorsullanischer 
Zeit. München 1962. p. 76. 
47 Kunkel 1966. p. 223. 
48 Kaser 1971. p. 69. Die Eindordnung der hauslichen Gerichtsbarkeit in den Bezirk der mores läßt vielmehr 
deutlich erkennen, daß sie bei der Scheidung von Recht und Sitte aus der Rechtsordnung ausschlossen worden 
ist. 
49 Geib, Gustav: Die Geschichte des römsichen Criminalprozesses. L ipzig 1842. p. 82. 
50 Sen. contr. 10, 2, 8. cetera iura puto, paterno imperio subiecta esse; G ll 10, 23, 4. Vir… mulieri iudex pro 
censore est, imperium quod videtur habet. Sen. epist. 47, 14. Maiores nostri dominum patrem familias 
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Bonfante has already called the attention resolutely to this point.51 This opinion was shared by 
Düll, although in his view in iudicium domesticum the pater familias was not necessarily 
bound by the opinion of the consilium.52 Kunkel ties the wife’s and children’s capital 
culpability by all means to consilium, and believes that the pater familias could not make 
himself independent of the majority judgement of the consilium with regard to guilt or 
innocence of the accused.53 Below we provide a few examples which reveal that if the father 
wanted to exercise the ius vitae ac necis he was entitled to and wanted to be exempted from 
the charge of murder, he had to deal with the case in consilium necessariorum. 
Livy discloses two traditions on the conviction and death of Cassius.54 According to one of 
them, his father executed the death sentence on him; after he had held the necessary trial at his 
home, he had his son whipped and executed. He offered the son’s property to Ceres, he had a 
statue made of that and had it written on it that it had been made by Cassius’s family. 
According to the other tradition, quaestores Caeso Fabius and L. Valerius brought a charge 
against Cassisus due to perduellio and convicted him in the proceedings conducted before the 
comitium in 486/5 B.C. Livius tends to give credit to the scond tradition, however, the 
impossibility of this version has already been demonstrated by Mommsen too.55 Therefore, in 
the tradition that can be considered authentic, an example of iudicium domesticum is 
presented to us. Killing on the father’s order is not arbitrary because the cases have been 
investigated and negotiated. Livy does not expressly refer to consilium necessariorum, 
however, as the other cases published by him reveal this was natural to the writer of the age of 
Augustus, his intention by giving this account was primarily to highlight the severitas and 
gravitas of heads of family of ancient times.56 According to Voci, the fact that it is the word 
familia and not the word pater that can be read on the statue erected for Ceres rf rs to a 
giudizio commune.57 In the present case it seems to be proper to translate the word familia as 
family and not as property because also Livius mentions the consecratio of the son’s peculium 
only, and familia (pecuniaque)58 was not used as a synonym of peculium. The phrase 
damnatus, for that matter, does not prove that the father had adopted the judgment 
independently, sine consilio because the words condemnare and damnare in classical quaestio 
lawsuits denote the activity of the accuser too.59  
                                                                                                                                                        
appellaverunt, honores illis in domo gerere, ius dicere permiserunt et domum pusillam rem publicam esse 
iudicaverunt. 
51 Bonfante, Pietro: Corso di diritto romano. Roma 1925. I. p. 98. Tutto quanto il diritto punitivo del 
paterfamilias non e poi altrimenti spiegabile che come l’esercizio di un impero giurisdizionale. Le forme sono 
quelle di un giudizio publico; come il magistrato ha un consilium di sua libera scelta, cosi il paterfamilias 
convoca all’uopo un consilium necessariorum o propinquorum o anche di amici e di persone autorevoli—in un 
caso, si narra, un paterfamilias chiamo a consiglio quasi tutto il senato—ed ha luogo un vero giudizio, iudicium 
domesticum. 
52 Düll, Rudolf: Iudicium domesticum, abdicatio und apoceryxis. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 63. 1946. pp. 54–116., 60. 
53 Kunkel 1966. p. 249. 
54 Liv. 2, 41, 10-12. Quem ubi primum magistratu abiit damnatum necatumque contstat. Sunt qui patrem 
auctorem eius supplicii ferant: eum cognita domi causa verberasse ac necasse peculiumque filii Cereri 
consecravisse; signum inde factum esse et inscriptum: ’Ex Cassia familia datum.’ Invenio apud quosdam, idque 
propius fidem est, a quaestoribus Caesone Fabio et L. Valerio diem dictam perduellionis, damnatumque populi 
iudicio, dirutas publice aedes. Ea est area ante Telluris aedem. Ceterum sive illud domesticum sive public m fuit 
iudicium, damnatur Servio Cornelio Q. Fabio consulib s. 
55 Mommsen, Theodor: Römisches Staatrecht I–III. Berlin 1887–1888. II. p. 541. 
56 Kunkel 1966. p. 225. 
57 Voci, Pasquale: Storia della patria potestas da Augusto a Diocleziano. IURA 31. 1980. pp. 37–100., 53. 
58 See also Zlinszky, János: Familia pecuniaque. Jogtörténeti Tanulmányok VI. Budapest 1986. pp. 395-406. 
59 ThLL IV. 125 condemno B de accusatore: efficere ut is quocum agitur condemnetur; V. 17 damno B de 
accusatore, efficere ut is quocum agitur damnetur. 
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According to Valerius Maximus L. Gellius (cos. 72 B.C.; censor 70 B.C.), who charged his 
son with the intention to kill him and having committed adultery with his stepmother, invited 
almost the entire senatus to the trial to judge his son’s crime.60 He disclosed his suspicion to 
the accused and allowed him to defend himself; then, after very careful deliberation of the 
case he acquitted him on the grounds of the judgement of the consilium and of his own. The 
judgment was adopted de consilii sententia, so it was based on the votes of the consilium; sua 
sententia refers merely to the fact that the father found his son innocent too.61 Volterra asserts 
that the father, being convinced of his son’s innocence from the outset, convened the 
consilium to clarify his own honesty and to save his son from the popular action proceedings 
of parricidium.62 Kunkel, however, calls the attention to the point that the source does not 
contain any reference to that, what is more, it speaks about a highly careful investigation of 
the charge, and that the state of facts of parricidium had never been extended to merely 
attempted or planned crime and that the assassination tempt was to be punished in certain 
cases only, even after lex Cornelia de sicariis.63 
According to Seneca L. Tarius Rufus (cos. suff. 16 B.C.) punished his son, who tried to kill 
him, by exile only, and continued to pay him the prviously set annuity.64 If Seneca praised 
the bonus pater familias only, then the description of the case would serve as a proof of the 
unlimited punitive power of pater familias. The philosopher, however, commemorates 
Augustus too as bonus princeps. The praise of the emperor and description of his behaviour 
clearly reveals that the filius’s crime was judged by a consilium, and Augustus was its most 
respected member, however, a member only, because, taking care that the father should 
conduct the cognitio, he did not ask the consilium and its members to appear before him, 
instead, he went to see them at the home of the head of the family. After the cognitio had been 
conducted, in which his son was allowed to defend himself, in accordance with usual order of 
procedure the persons present cast their vote orally on the issue of the son’s guilt, however, 
Augustus, preventing his own vote cast first as the ballot of the most highly ranked person 
from influencing the others, proposed voting in writing. After the boards, on which the 
sententias were written, had been collected but had not been op ed yet, he made an oath that 
he would not accept Tarius’s inheritance. So, in ths case the issue of guilt was decided in 
writing, and he did not want to influence them. In imposing the punishment, however, he 
wanted to urge the consilium to adopt a lenient judgment, which was carried out orally. Tarius 
had to decide on the basis of the majority of the votes cast, because if he had considered the 
sententias advice only, then Augustus’s efforts not to influence anybody by his vote and to 
count his ballot as equal to the other votes would have been unnecessary. 
                                                 
60 Val. Max. 5, 9, 1. L. Gellius onmibus honoribus ad censuram defunctus, c m gravissima crimina de filio, in 
novercam conmissum stuprum et parricidium cogitatum, propemodum explorata haberet, non tamen ad 
vindictam continuo procucurrit, sed paene universo senatu adhibito in consilium expositis suspicionibus 
defendendi se adulescenti potestatem fecit inspectaque diligentissime causa absolvit eum cum sonsilii tum etiam 
sua sententia. Quod si impetu irae abstractus saevire festinasset, admisisset magis scelus quam vindicassset. 
61 Kunkel 1966. p. 224. 
62 Volterra 1948. p. 133. 
63 Kunkel 1966. p. 224. 
64 Sen. clem. 1, 15, 2–6. Cogniturus de filio Tarius advocavit in consilium Carsarem Augustum; venit in privatos 
penates, adsedit pars alieni consilii fuit, non dixit: ’Immo in domum meam veniat’, quod si factum esset, 
Caesaris futura erat cognitio, non patris. Audita cusa excussisque omnibus ex his quae adulescens pro e 
dixerat, et his, quibus arguebatur, petit, ut sententiam suam auisque scriberet, ne ea omium fieret, quae Caesaris 
fuisset. Deinde priusquam aperientur codicilli, iuravit se Tarii, hominis locupletis, hereditatem non aditurum. 
Tarius quidem eodem die et alterum heredem perdidit, sed Caesar libertatem sententiae suae redemit; et 
postquam adprobavit gratuitam esse severitatem suam, quod principi semper curandum est, dixit relegandum, 
quo patri videretur. 
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In the case referred by Marcian, emperor Hadrian sent a father to exile who killed his son 
while they were hunting because he had an adulterous affair with his stepmother.65 According 
to the emperor, the act of assassination is a deed worthy of a rogue and not a father, as the 
essence of patria potestas is pietas and not cruelty. The father should not have killed his son 
even if he had caught him in the act of adultery with his stepmother as he was not entitled to 
do that by lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis.66 Whereas, if the above mentioned law would 
have entitled the pater familias to kill his son or wife caught in the act of adultery, here he 
should not have exercised his such right because thi  was not a case of being caught in the act 
but a permanent adulterous affair ( the phrase adulterabat is used here as durativum). In this 
case in iudicium domesticum a consilium should have been convened to judge over the 
offenders. The father did not do that, instead, he assassinated his son. It is more probable that 
here Hadrian punishes the father due to lack of proper punitive proceedings, iudicium 
domesticum and not just schimpliche Gesinnung, as Kaser presumes.67 
Special attention should be paid to the fragment of Ulpian that states that the father shall not 
kill his son without hearing him; instead, he shall bring a charge against him before the 
principals of the province.68 The first part of the text (indauditum filium pater occidere non 
potest) is perhaps the only trace of the existence of iudicium domesticum in Iustinian’s Digest. 
The originality of the second part of the text (sed accusare eum apud praefectum praesidemve 
provinciae debet) has been questioned by Mommsen already69, and Bonfante clearly 
considered it interpolated.70 Perozzi believed that the description was possibly original 
because in his view in the times of Severus the rights the father was entitled to had not lost 
their effect yet, they were subordinated to the obligation to report to the magistratus only.71 
Kunkel adds the following explanation to this locus: The first part forbids the father to kill his 
son without hearing him; the second part, however, cl arly refuses to give him the right of 
killing and thereby entirely and generally orders him to bring a charge before the State’s court 
of justice. Therefore, it is probable that the original text applied to the case of holding the 
iudicium domesticum, and if under it the filius was allowed to defend himself, it permitted the 
killing of the son. Furthermore, in his opinion, the part on praeses and praefectus is not 
necessarily interpolated because the father could also waive exercising his punitive power and 
bring the son’s crime before public court of justice, and so, perhaps, the compilers deleted the 
reference to iudicium domesticum only, which might have run as follows: ”sed cognoscere de 
eo cum amicis vel accusare eum apud praefectum praesidemve provinciae debet.”72 
In the Digest, apart from the above-mentioned case, all traces of iudicium domesticum and 
consilium necessariorum had been carefully deleted by the compilers as p tria potestas had 
been reduced to a merely instructive, disciplinary power already before Iustinianus, and so the 
ius vitae ac necis exercised in iudicium domesticum had completely lost its significance. 
Consequently, the lack of iudicium domesticum and consilium cannot be proved by the 
argumentum e silentio that we cannot find any reference to them in Iustinian’s codification.73  
                                                 
65 Marc. D. 48, 9, 5. Divus Hadrianus fertur, cum in venatione filium suum quidam necaverat, qui novercam 
adulterabat, in insulam eum deportasse, quod latronis magis quam patris iure eum interfecit: nam patria 
potestas in pietate debet, non atrocitate consistere. 
66 D. 48, 5. 
67 Kaser 1971. p. 69. 
68 Ulp. D. 48, 8, 2. Indauditum filium pater occidere non potest sed accusare eum apud praefectum praesidemve 
provinciae debet. 
69 Mommsen 1899. p. 618. 
70 Bonfante 1925. p. 111. 
71 Perozzi, Silvio: Instituzioni di diritto romano. Roma 1928. I. p. 424. On the contrary see Kunkel 1966. p. 248. 
72 Kunkel 1966. p. 249. 
73 Kunkel 1966. p. 247. 
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The fact that iudicium domesticum was required in order to exercise ius vitae ac necis is 
apparent from the above. In certain exceptional cases the law allowed killing sine iudicio too. 
Among these cases the regulations of lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis had highly great 
significance. This law provides the father with theright to kill both his daughter caught in the 
act of adultery and the man committing adultery, with impunity; however, it confines this 
right to certain terms and limits.74 The daughter had to be under the father’s75 potestas76, the 
adulterium had to be committed at his own or his son-in-law’s house77, the father had to kill 
his daughter too, along with the man. If he killed the correus only, it was considered 
homicida, and his deed was to be judged in accordance with lex Cornelia de sicariis.78 The 
father who killed the correus only was not punishable in the event that his daughter stayed 
alive because she fled and not because the father sav d her life.79 The rescripta of emperors 
Marcus Aurelius and Commodus provided the father with acquittal from the charge of 
homicidium in the case where the father had killed the correus but his daughter stayed alive, if 
the father had seriously wounded the daughter—which reveals that he wanted to kill her—but 
his daughter recovered owing to pure luck.80 The father had to catch the offenders in ipsis 
rebus Veneris.81 He had to kill both offenders at the same time, without any delay (uno ictu et 
uno impetu et aequali ira).82 If the father killed his daughter only after a certain amount of 
time has elapsed, it was deemed homicida, if, however, the daughter escaped, and the father 
reached and killed her—as he acted continuatione animi—he was acquitted from the charge of 
homicidium.83 What is the connection between ius vitae ac necis arising from patria potestas 
and ius occidendi provided by lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis?84 Papinian85, to the question 
                                                 
74 Cantarella, Eva: Adulterio, omicidio legittimo e causa d’onore in diritto romano. Studi in onore di G. Scherillo 
I. Milano 1972. pp. 243–274. 
75 Pap. D. 48, 5, 23. (22) Nec in ea lege naturalis ab adoptivo pater separatur. 
76 Pap. D. 48, 5, 21. (20) Patri datur ius occidendi adulterum cum filia quam in potestate habet: itaque nemo 
alius ex  patribus idem iure faciet: sed nec filius familias pater. Ulp. D. 48, 5, 24 (23), 2. Quare non, ubicumque 
deprehenderit pater, permittitur ei occidere, sed domi suae generive sui tantum, illa ratio redditur, quod 
maiorem iniuriam putavit legislator, quod in domum patris aut mariti ausa fuerit filia adulterum inducere. 
77 Paul. Coll. 4, 12, 1. Permittitur patri tam adoptivo quam naturali, adulterum cum filia cuiusque dignitatis 
domi suae vel generi sui deprehensum sua namu occidere. 
78 Paul. Coll. 4, 2, 6. Sed si filiam non interfecerit sed solum adulterum, homicidii reus est. Pap. Coll. 4, 9, 1. Si 
pater quis adulterum occidit et filiae suae pepercit, quaero quid adversus eum sit statuendum? Respondit: sine 
dubio iste pater homicida est: igitur tenebitur lege Cornelia se sicariis. 
79 Pap. Coll. 4, 9, 2. Plane si filia non voluntate patris, sed casu servata est, non minimam habebit defensionem 
pater, quod forte fugit filia. Nam lex ita punit homicidam, si dolo malo homicidium factum fuerit, hic autem 
pater non ideo servavit filiam, quia voluit, sed quia occidere eam non potuit. 
80 Mac. D. 48, 5, 33. (32) Nihil interest, adulteram filiam prius pater occiderit an non, dum utrumque occidat: 
nam si alterum occidit, lege Cornelia reus erit. Quod si altero occiso alter vulreatus fuerit, verbis quidem legis 
non liberatur: sed divus Marcus it Commodus rescripserunt impunitatem ei concedi, quia licet intermpto 
adultero mulier supervixerit post tam gravia vulnera, quae ei pater infixerat, magis fato quam voluntate eius 
servata est. 
81 Ulp. D. 48, 5, 24 (23) Quod ait lex ’in filia adulterum deprehenderit’, no otiosum videtur: voluit enim ita 
demum hanc potestatem patri competere, si in ipsa turpitudine filiam de adulterio deprehendat. Labeo quo ue 
ita probat, et Pomponius scripsit in ipsis rebus Veneris deprehensum occidi: et hoc est quod Solo it Draco dicunt 
en erga. 
82 Ulp. D. 48, 5, 24 (23), 4. Quod ait lex ’in continenti filiam occidat’, sic erit accipiendum, ne occiso hodie 
adultero reservet et post dies filiam occidat, vel contra: debet enim prope uno ictu et uno impetu utrumque 
occidere, aequali ira adversus utrumque sumpta. Quod si non affectavit, sed, dum adulterum occidit, profugit 
fulia et interpositis horis adprehensa est a patre qui persequebatur, in continenti, videbutur occidisse. 
83 Paul. Coll. 4, 2, 6–7. Sed si filiam non interfecerit, sed solum adulterum, homicidii reus est. Et si intervallo 
filiam interfecerit, tandundem est, nisi persecutus illam interfecerit: continuatione enim animi videtur legis 
autorictate fecisse. 
84 Pap. Coll. 4, 8, 1. Cum patri lex regia dederit in filium vitae necisque potestatem, quod bonum fuit lege 
conprehendi, ut potestas fieret etiam filiam occidendi, velis mihi rescribere; nam scire cupio. Respondit umquid 
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why it was necessary to set forth in law that the father had the power to kill his daughter too 
although the relevant lex regia granted him vitae necisque potestas over his children, responds 
that the law does not vest the father with new power, instead, it obliges him to kill his 
daughter too together with the man committing adultery because thereby—i.e., if he does not 
pardon his daughter either—he acts with greater equity. The question might arise why it is 
necessary to discuss this legal institution in details in the Digest and the Collatio. As it has 
become apparent from the above, the father’s ius vitae ac necis terminated in the 4th c. already 
and careful compilers deleted almost all references to iudicium domesticum necessarily related 
to it. Thus, it became indispensable to maintain lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, which 
continued to operate now without i s vitae ac necis arising from patria potestas. 
Ius occidendi that may be exercised over the daughter caught in the act of adultery is an 
organic part of patria potestas. Probably, here they applied the criminal law principle that 
punishment—in the present case: killing—of offenders caught in the act (manifesti) was 
permitted without proceedings too.86 This right would continue to hold against a married 
daughter too, even if his father had given her in mariti manum, which is probably connected 
with the provisions of lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis that restricted manus. Namely, 
according to leges regiae, the husband judged, in the consilium domesticum together with 
relatives, over his wife’s acts to be punished by death such as adultery and drinking wine.87 If, 
however, he had caught her wife in the act of adultery (in adulterio uxorem tuam si 
prehendisses), according to Cato, he could kill her with impunity (impune) and without any 
special proceedings (ine iudicio).88 The lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, however, deprived 
the husband from this right, even in the case where his wife was under manus; thereby 
Augustus weakened manus and adjusted it to the current conditions of the ag .89 He argued 
that whereas father’s love encouraged him to give pardon, a husband’s rage urged him to take 
hasty revenge.90 If the husband nevertheless killed his wife caught in the act of adultery, he 
had to account for his act under l x Cornelia de sicariis.91 
The father’s ius vitae ac necis remained untouched until the 4th c. A.D. in spite of minor or 
greater legal or out-of-law restrictions. Constantine speaks about ius vitae ac necis till as a 
living legal institution.92 In 365, this right of the pater familias weakened to pure punitive 
power; the emperor’s decree determined the father’s duty that he should reprimand young 
people for their blunders, and should prevent them fro  committing further faults.93 With a 
                                                                                                                                                        
ex contrario praestat nobis argumentum haec adiectio, ut non videatur lex non habenti dedisse, sed occidi eam 
adultero iussisse, ut videatur maiore aequitate ductus adulterum occidisse, cum nec filiae pepercerit? 
85 A szöveg eredetiségét illetően lásd Rabello 216. 
86 Kunkel 1966. p. 240. 
87 Dion. Hal. 2, 25. 
88 Gell. 10, 23, 4. Verba Marci Catonis adscripsi ex oratione quae inscribitur De dote, in qua id quoque 
scriptum est, in adulterio uxores deprehensas ius fuisse maritis necare: ’Vir’ inquit ’cum divotium fecit, mulieri 
iudex pro censore est, imperium quod videtur habet, si quid perverse taetreque factum est a muliere; multiatur si 
vinum bibit; si cum alieno viro probri quid fecit, condemnatur.’ De iure autem occidenti ita scriptum est: ’In 
adulterio uxorem tuam si prehendisses, sine iudicio impune necares; illa re, si adulterares sive tu adulterare, 
digito non audetur contingere, neque ius est.’ 
89 Kunkel 1966. p. 237. 
90 Pap. D. 48, 5, 23 (22), 4. Ideo autem patri, non marito mulierem et omnem adulter m remissum est occidere, 
quod plerumque pietas paterni nominis consilium proliberis capit: ceterum mariti calor et impetus facile 
decernentis fuit refrenandus. 
91 Pap. Coll. 4, 10, 1. Si maritus uxorem suam in adulterio deprehensam occidit, an in legem de sicariis incidat, 
quaero. Respondit: nulla parte legis marito uxorem occidere conceditur: quare aperte contra legem fecisse eum 
non ambigitur. 
92 CTh. 4, 8, 6. Libertati a maioribus tantum impensum est, ut patribus, quibus ius vitae in liberos necisque 
potestas permissa est, eripere libertatem non liceret. 
93 C. 9, 15, 1. In corrigendis minoribus pro qualitate dilicti senior bus propinquis tribuimus potestatem, ut quos 
ad vitae decora domesticae laudis exempla non provocant, saltem correctionis medicina compellat. Neque nos in 
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few changes, Iustinianus borrowed Constantine’s text from Codex Theodosianus. However, 
he made such changes specifically with regard to ius vitae ac necis as he mentioned it merely 
as the power that the pater familias used to be entitled to.94 This clearly reveals that by the age 
of Iustinianus ius vitae ac necis as a legal institution had long become extinct, and pplication 
of the provisions set forth therein was subject to criminal law regulation.  
 
II.  Ius exponendi and ius vitae ac necis exercised over newborn infants had been contained 
from the outset by patria potestas. A lex regia left to later ages under the name Romulus 
obliged the pater familias to bring up every male child and firstborn female child, and forbade 
him to kill children younger than three years, except for deformed children immediately after 
their birth. It did not forbid exposition of the latter either, however, it set the condition that 
they had to be shown to five neighbours. On those who might not comply with this law, it 
imposed the punishment of confiscating half of their property.95 This norm, which belonged to 
the system of sacral law, had at one time actually restricted patria potestas, yet, later on we 
can find no reference to its application—especially with regard to applying forfeiture of 
property as sanction in such cases. 
After that, we learn from Cicero of a provision of the Twelve Table Law, which probably not 
only allowed but ordered the xpositio of deformed children: ”Cito necatus tamquam ex XII 
tabulis insignis ad deformitatem puer.”96 Just as Romulus’s lex regia did not forbid exposition 
of deformed children, the norm from the Twelve Table Law left to us from Cicero’s De 
legibus also permits, what is more, perhaps orders their destruction. Leges regiae provides for 
exposition of children, the Twelve Table Law for killing children, however, presumably these 
phrases in these sources—even if they are not used as synonyms—denote acts with identical 
outcome in terms of the child’s fate. For, in the case of deformed children nobody thought of 
adopting and bringing them up, which can be attribued to practical and religious causes. In 
Roman thinking, a deformed child was considered prodigium, which the community had to be 
get rid of during procuratio prodigii. Romans called the usual order, repose of the world pax 
deum, which meant gods’ peaceful relation to men, and if this order was upset, it could be 
always attributed to gods stepping out of this repos .97 Breaking down of the cosmic order, so 
every extraordinary, new event was considered prodigium.98 The etymology of the word is 
dubious; in Walde–Hofmann’s interpretation prodigium comes from prod-aio,99 accordingly 
prodigium means foretelling or forecastring. This approach does not seem to be acceptable 
because “prodigium itself does not declare anything”100, actually, needs to be interpreted, that 
is why they used the assistance of p ntifexes, the Sibylla books or haruspexes.101 There is a 
more proper interpretation claiming that the word comes from the compound prod-agere, so 
prodigium is nothing else than ”breaking through this shell, supernatural forces hiding 
behind the surface come forth, become manifest”.102 Whenever prodigium appeared, be it of a 
private or state kind, after its meaning had been found out, that is, interpreted, procuratio had 
                                                                                                                                                        
puniendis morum vitiis potestatem in immensum extendi volumus, sed iure patrio auctoritas corrigat proinqui 
iuvenis erratum et privata animadversione compescat. 
94 C. 8, 46, 10. Libertati a maioribus tantum impensum est, ut patribus, quibus ius vitae in liberos necisque 
potestas olimerat permissa, eripere libertatem non liceret. 
95 Dion. Hal. 2, 15. 
96 XII tab. 4, 1. (Cic. leg. 3, 8, 19) 
97 Köves-Zulauf, Thomas: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe. (Introduction into the History of 
Roman Religion and saga) Budapest 1995. p.  61. 
98 Zintzen, Clemens: Prodigium. Der Kleine Pauly. München 1979. IV. pp. 1151–1153. 
99 Walde, Alois–Hofmann, Johann Baptist: Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch I–II. Heidelberg 1954. II. p. 
368. 
100 Köves-Zulauf 1995. p. 62. 
101 Zintzen 1979. 1153. 
102 Köves-Zulauf 1995. 62. 
 12
to be carried out, upon the proposal made again by the interpreters; if the same prodigium 
recurred more frequently, the pontifices always ordered the same conciliation.103 (For 
example, if stone rain was falling, novemdiale sacrum had to be held.104) Deformed children 
had to be destroyed105, and children born on an ominous day were considered p odigium 
too.106 Sueton describes that on the day of Britannicus’s death stones were thrown at the 
temples, altars were turned over, the Lares were driven to the street, and children were 
exposed. The procuratio of deformed children considered prodigium was usually carried out 
by killing or exposition; however, it should be adde  that in these cases exposition always 
meant that the child was destined to die, the outcome f the two acts was eventually identical. 
The procuratio had to be always bloodless, therefore they performed it by drowning.107 
Data on newer regulation of ius exponendi are available from a much later period, the 4th c. 
A.D. only, so it is possible that this element of patria potestas had not been considerably 
limited until then. Exposition of children could be attributed, as a matter of fact, not only to 
religious causes, in this period either. Likewise, the father could expose the child that it was 
not willing to acknowledge as his own due to the mother’s alleged or real infidelity or that he 
did not want to bring up because of his poverty or other economic reasons. In these cases the 
child was not meant to perish; they exposed it at a place where others could easily find it.108 
As a matter of fact, we know of cases where a child, aving been admitted, was meant and 
instructed to be a prostitute or gladiator (ad servitutem aut ad lupanar).109 It occurred that the 
father met and got familiar with his formerly exposed daughter now as a prostitute.110 Several 
of them were afflicted and forced to beg.111 
Sources from the age before Constantinus do not provide a uniform picture on the legal status 
of exposed children. In Plautus’s and Terence’s plays exposed and then admitted children 
keep their free status.112 In Plautus’s comedy Casina, the exposed female child was admitted 
by the libertina Cleostrata, who gave her the name Casina. Casina, having grown up, became 
the wife of Eutyrichus also having free status. In Cistellaria by Plautus, the procuress 
Melaenis admitted and brought up the exposed Selenium born as a free person, who later 
married the free Alcesimarchus. In Terence’s Heautontimorumenos, Antiphila, who was 
exposed by his mother, Sostrata, kept his free status, and married the also free Clinia. At the 
same time it is beyond doubt that several exposed chil ren were forced to live as a slave.113 
                                                 
103 Latte, Kurt: Römische Religionsgeschichte. München 1967. p. 204. 
104 Liv. 1, 33, 4; 30, 38, 9. In Palatio lapidibus pluit, id prodigium more novemdialisacro, cetera hostiis 
maioribus expiata. 
105 Liv. 27, 37, 6; 31, 12, 7; 39, 22, 5. 
106 Suet. Cal. 5. Quo defunctus est die, lapidata sunt templa, subversae deum areae, Lares quibusdam familiares 
in publicum abiecti, partus expositi. 
107 Sen. ira 1, 15. Portentosos fetus extinguimus, liberos quoque, si deb les monstrosique editi sunt, mergimus. 
Tib. 2, 5, 79. Prodigia indomitis merge sub aequoribus. 
108 Cf. Fest. s. v. Lactaria columna in foro olitorio dicta, quod ibi infantes lacte alendos deferebant. 
109 Lact. inst. 6, 20, 18; Memmer, Michael: Ad servitutem aut ad lupanar ... Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 108. 1991. pp. 21–93. 
110 Min. Fel. 31, 4; Iust. apol. 1, 27; Boswell, John Eastburn: Expositio and Oblatio. The Abandonment of 
Children in the Ancient and Medieval Family. American Historical Review 89. 1984. pp. 10–33. Incest 
comprised the single most common objection of Christian moralists to expositio, and no solution to this problem 
presented itself. Few, if any fathers of the church objected to abandonment as a dereliction of parental duty. In 
the relatively few places where early Christian literature touched on the practice, which it describes as common, 
authors complained of the possibility that parents might unknowingly use as prostitutes children they once 
abandoned.  
111 Sen. contr. 10, 4. Quidam expositos debilitabat et debilitatos mendicare cogebat ac mercedem exigebat ab 
eis. 
112 Memmer 1991. p. 26. 
113 Sen. contr. 10, 4, 13. Deinde, an hoc non licuerit illi facere. Licuit, inquit, expositi in nullo numero sunt, servi 
sunt. 
 13
Sueton provides information first on M. Antonius Gnipho, who was born free in Gaul 
(ingenuus), however, was exposed as a child, and was then lib rated and educated by the 
person who brought him up. After that he mentions that Gnipho was a highly talented man 
with outstanding power of memory, who acquired erudition in both Latin and Greek.114 The 
second source is about C. Melissus born also free (ing nuus) in Spoletium, who was exposed 
in his childhood due to conflicts between the parents.115 Thanks to the person who brought 
him up and admitted him, he was given training in higher sciences, and was recommended to 
Maecenas as a grammarian. Maecenas made friends with him, and although his mother 
supported his son’s freedom too—using the claim called adsertio libertatis—Melissus 
nevertheless remained in statu servitutis because he deemed it more than his original descent. 
Weiss interpreted the phrases ingenuus natus and manumissus as opposites, and derived 
Gnipho’s slave status therefrom.116 According to Coril, in this text in servitute denotes merely 
a de facto status and not that the child had been made servus also de iure.117  Watson believes 
that Suetonius does not use the phrases status servitutis or manumissus as terminus technicus, 
so it would have been unnecessary to pay special attention to them.118 Manumissus not 
necessarily refers to status servitutis since they used remancipatio or manumissio also in the 
case of filius in mancipium.119 The father could reclaim his exposed child from the nutritor 
after having reimbursed the costs of alimentatio.120 
On the legal status of children born free and then exposed, Pliny the Younger, propraetor of 
Bithynia and emperor Traianus exchanged letters. The letters were presumably dated in 
Plinius’s second year in office, in 111.121 In his letter, Plinius presents the issue of the status 
and alimentatio of children born free and then exposed, called threptos, as a problem affecting 
the entire province to emperor Traianus, as he has not found a rule that applies either 
expressly to Bithynia or the whole empire and believ s that he could not be satisfied with 
other examples in a matter that can be decided solely by the emperor’s authority. Although he 
knows about certain epistulae and edicta, such as for example those issued by emperors 
Augustus, Vespasianus and Titus for Andania, Sparta and Achaia, they all contain particular 
rules only, and therefore cannot be applied to Pliny’s province. Otherwise, he does not send 
Traianus the copies of the documents referred to because they are probably available in the 
emperor’s archives, which much better text.122 In his response letter, Traianus precisely 
                                                 
114 Suet. gramm. 7. M. Antonius Gnipho, ingenuus in Gallia natus sed expositus, a nutritore suo manumissus 
institutusque fuisse dicitur ingenii magni, memoriae singularis, nec minus Graece quam Latine doctus. 
115 Suet. gramm. 21. C. Melissus, Spoleti natus ingenuus, sed ob discordium parentum expositus, cura et 
industria educatoris sui altiora studia percepit, ac Maecenati pro grammatico muneri datus est. Cui cum se 
gratum et acceptum in modum amici videret, quamquam asserente matre, permansit tamen is statu servitutis 
praesentemque condicionem verae origini anteposuit. 
116 Weiss, Egon: Peregrinische Manzipationsakte. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, 
Romanistische Abteilung 37. 1917. pp. 136–176. 
117 Cornil, Georges: Contribution à l’étude de la patria potestas. Paris 1897. p. 428. 
118 Watson 1967. p. 171. 
119 Kaser, Max: Das römische Privatrecht I–II. München 1971–1975. I. p. 65. 
120 Sen. contr. 9, 3. Expositum qui agnoverit, solutis alimentis recipiat. 
121 Plin. epist. 10, 65. C. Plinius Traiano Imperatori. Magna, domine, et ad totam provinciam pertinens quaestio 
est de condicione et alimentis eorum, quos vocant threp us in qua ego auditis constitutionibus principum quia 
nihil inveniebam aut proprium, aut universale, quod a  Bithynos ferretur, consulendum te existimavi, quid 
observari velles; neque enim putavi posse me in eo, qu d auctoritatem tuam posceret, exemplis esse contentum. 
Recitabatur autem apud me edictum, quod dicebatur divi Augusti, ad Andaniam pertinens; recitatae epistulae et 
divi Vespasiani ad Lacedaemonios et divi Titi ad eosdem et Achaeos, et Domitiani ad Avidium Nigrinum et 
Armenium Brocchum proconsules, idem ad Lacedaemonios, quae ideo tibi non misi, quia et parum emendata et 
quaedam non certae fidei videbantur, et quia vera et emendata in scriniis tuis esse credebam. 
122 Plin. epist. 10, 66. Traianus Plinio. Quaestio ista, quae pertinet ad eos, qui liberi nati expositi, deinde sublati 
a quibusdam et in sevitute educati sunt, saepe tractat  est, nec quicquam invenitur in commentariis eorum, qui 
ante me fuerunt, quod ad omnes provincis sit constitutum. Epistulae sane sunt Domitiani ad Avidium Negrinum 
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formulates the question raised by Pliny: so, the issue addressed concerns children born free 
who have been exposed by their parents and then have been admitted and brought up as slaves 
by others. Traianus mentions that his predecessors have indeed settled this issue with general 
effect extending to each province, and refers to Domitianus’s two epistulae written to 
proconsules Avidius Negrinus and Armenius Brocchus, which are perhaps not to be fully 
ignored, however, as they do not have a general scope, cannot be applied to Bithynia. 
Traianus grants the opportunity of adsertio in libertatem, and refuses to give the nutritor the 
right to claim reimbursement of the costs of alimentatio and ius retentionis that serves to 
ensure that. The question arises who may enforce plea for freedom. As it was vindicatio in 
libertatem and not vindicatio in patriam potestatem that Traianus permitted, according to 
Cornil, it was not the parents but the child itself that was entitled to the right of vindicatio.123 
Yet, because a child living as a slave was not allowed to initiate a lawsuit, action taken by the 
adsertor was needed to represent the child in the lawsuit.124 Consequently, Traianus sets out 
from the child’s status libertatis that, accordingly, cannot be lost.125 The costs of alimentatio 
are not be reimbursed because in the present case regaining freedom is not ransoming from 
status sevitutis but liberation from slavery.126 
According to Scaevola’s fragment, which also bears decisive significance in determining the 
legal status of exposed children, a Roman citizen divorced his wife and married again.127 The 
cast off wife exposed the child, who was brought up by a third party. In his last will and 
testament the father, as he did not know if his son was alive or not, did not name him as his 
inheritor and did not disinherit him either. Following his father’s death, the son, once he had 
been recognised by his mother and father’s mother, ook possession of the estate as legitimus 
heres. In Scaevola’s view, the last will was invalid because the son was under patria potestas, 
even if his father did not know about it.128 According to Paulus, the exposed child will retain 
its status libertatis, even if it might not be aware of it and might consider itself a slave.129 
In the rescriptum of emperors Diocletianus and Maximianus, dated 295, addressed to 
Rhodonus, the following can be read:130 Rhodonus admitted and brought up a girl born free 
and exposed, and after she had grown up, he meant hr to marry his son. Before entering into 
the marriage, the natural father took action and claimed to release his daughter. The father 
                                                                                                                                                        
et Armenium Brocchum, quae fortasse debeant observari: sed inter eas provincias, de quibus rescripsit, non est 
Binthya. Et ideo nec adsertationem denegandam iis, qui ex eius modi causa in libertatem vindicabuntur, puto, 
neque ipsam libertatem redimendam pretio alimentorum. 
123 Cornil 1897. p. 430. 
124 Memmer 1991. p. 33. 
125 See also Bang, Martin: Die Herkunft der römisches Sklaven II. Die Rechtsgründe der Unfreiheit. Mitteilungen 
des kaiserlich deutschen archäologischen Instituts. Röm. Abt. 27. 1912. 
126 Memmer 1991. p. 34. 
127 Scaev. D. 40, 4, 29. Uxorem praegnantem repudiaverat et aliam duxerat: prior enixa filium exposuit. Hic 
sublatus ab alio educatus est nomine patris vocitatus usque ad vitae tempus patris tam ab eo quam a matre, an 
vivorum numero esset, ignorabatur; mortuo patre testamentoque eius, quo filius neque exheredatus neque heres 
institutus sit, recitato filius et a matre et ab avia paterna adgnitus hereditatem patris ab intestato quasi legitimus 
possidet. Quaesitum est hi qui testamento libertatem acceperunt utrum liberi an servi sint. Respondit filium 
quidem nihil praeiudicii passum fuisse, si pater eum ignoravit, et ideo, cum in potestate et ignorantis patris 
esset, testamentum non valere. Servi autem manumissi si per quinquennium in libertate morati sunt, semel datam 
libertatem infirmari contrarium studium favore libertatis est. 
128 Gai. inst. 2, 123. 
129 Paul. D. 22, 6, 1, 2. Si quis nesciat se cognatum esse, interdum in iure, int rdum in facto errat.nam si liberum 
se esse et ex quibus natus sit sciat, iura autem cognationes habere se nesciat, in iure errat: at si quis (forte 
expositus) quorum parentium esset ignoret, fortasse et serviat alicui putans se servum esse, in facto magis, quam 
in iure errat. 
130 C. 5, 4, 16. Patrem, qui filiam exposuit, at nunc adultam sumptibus et labore tuo factam matrimonio coniungi 
filio desiderantis favere voto convenit. Qui si renitatur, alimentorum solutioni in hoc solummodo casu parere 
debet. 
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retained his potestas over the child, and he could have enforced it through praeiudicium de 
patria potestate.131 The question, however, concerned only the issue whether the father should 
reimburse the costs of alimentatio. In the rescriptum, the rulers decided that if the natural 
father should be against conclusion of marriage betwe n his daughter and the foster father’s 
son, then he should reimburse the costs of alimentatio, if, however, he agreed to it, then he 
would be exempted from reimbursing the costs. 
An exposed slave child also retains its innate status servitutis. The issue of ownership over the 
child was regulated by emperor Alexander Serverus in his rescriptum written to A. Claudius 
in 224:132 if the child was exposed without the dominus being aware of it or against his will, 
he was entitled to the right of  vindicatio, however, he had to reimburse the nutritor for his 
costs. On the other hand, if the dominus himself had the slave woman’s child exposed, then he 
would not be granted the right of repetitio. In accordance with the principle of derelictio, the 
slave child so exposed will retain its status, yet, will become a child having no dominus, and 
the collector will obtain ownership over him through occupatio.133 
Reference to the exposed child’s slave status can be found also among the contracts of the 
waxed boards of Dacia:134 on 17 March 139, in Kartum, purchase of a slave was entered into 
between Maximus Batonis and Dasius Versonis, its subject was an approximately six-year-old 
slave girl called Passia. The seller was obliged to name the origin of the slave in negotiating 
the purchase and sale135 as it highly influenced what occupation she was suitable for; for this 
reason, the aedilisi edictum also obliged those who sold slaves on the market to name their 
natio.136 Mommsen claims that the phrase empta sportellaria implies that the owner had 
purchased the girl’s mother, and was given the slave girl, Passia as a present since sportella 
means present.137 Weiss’s interpretation seems to be more probable, he asserts that the seller 
himself had purchased the girl as an exposed child, an  he proves it by the following:138 the 
papyruses reveal that the phrase sportellarius is identical with koptriaireios139, which always 
denotes the exposed child. Undoubtedly, sportella means a small basket, as in Hieronymus’s 
Vulgata regarding the exposition of Moses can be read.140 Fiscella, which is the deminutivum 
of fiscus that originally meant basket, is the synonym of sportella, and refers to the custom 
that a basket was often used when exposing a child. Therefore, sportellaria means a female 
child exposed in a basket; it is possible to get closer to this interpretation by certain Greek 
sources, which assert that a child was exposed also in some kind of vessel (ostrakon, 
enkhystria). 
Constantine’s law dated 17 April 331 brought significant change in the legal status of exposed 
children, for it extended the regulation pertaining to the fate of slave women’s children, 
adopted by Alexandrus Severus, to free children.141 Thus, the father who has exposed his 
                                                 
131 Memmer 1991. p. 38. 
132 C. 8, 51 (52), 1. Si invito vel ignorante te partus ancillae vel adscripciae axpositus est, repetere eum non 
prohiberis. Sed restitutio eius, non a fure vindicaveris, ita fiet, ut, si qua in alindo vel forte ad discendum 
artificium iuste consumpta fuerint, restitueris. 
133 Memmer 1991. p. 40. 
134 FIRA III. 284.=CIL III. 937. Maximus Batonis puellam nomine Passiam, sive ea quo alio nomine est, 
annorum circiter sex plus minus, empta sprotellaria emit mancipioque accepit de Dasio Verzonis Pirusta ex 
Kavieretio v/v ducentis quinque… 
135 Lenel, Otto: Das „Edictum Perpetuum”. Leipzig 1927. p. 554. Clausula de natione pronuntianda.  
136 Pólay, Elemér: A dáciai viaszostáblák szerződései. (Contracts of the tabulae ceratae from Dacia) Budapest 
1972. p. 146; Ulp. D. 21, 1, 31, 21. Nationem cuiusque in venditione pronuntiare debent.  
137 Pólay 1972. 146. 
138 Weiss 1917. p. 160. 
139 Aristoph. ran. 1190. 
140 Exod. 2, 3. Sumpsit fiscellam scripeam … posuitque intus infantulum et exposuit eum. 
141 CTh. 5, 9, 1. Quicumque puerum vel puellam, proiectam de domo patris vel domini voluntate scientiaque, 
collegerit ac suis alimentis ad robur provexerit, eundem retineat sub eodem statu, quem apud se collectum 
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child, will lose his potestas over the child, and thereby the right to reclaim the child. The 
nutritor freely decides the status of the admitted child, irrespective if the child was born as a 
free person or a slave. The phrase retineat sub eodem statu, quem apud se collectum voluerit 
agitare shows that the father was not given the opportunity of vindicatio in libertatem or 
adsertio libertatis.142 It is quite clear that this law provided highly effective protection for the 
person who brought up the exposed child. 
Restriction or prohibition of ius exponendi was implemented on the level of law rather late. In 
February 374, emperors Valentinianus, Valens and Gratianus ordered to impose death penalty 
for killing children.143 A month later Valentinianus declared that expositin of children was to 
be punished.144 As Valentinianus referred to an earlier punishment, it cannot be ruled out that 
he renewed a prohibition of exposition that had exist d for a long time. On the contrary, it is 
also possible—if we interpret xpositio as a form of necatio, which was not alien from post-
classical thinking at all—that Valentinianus referred to the prohibition of killing children 
dated February of the same year and the item of penalty imposed thereon.145 The latter 
standpoint can be supported by the argument that the addressee of both constitutiones was the 
same Probus praefectus praetorio. The item of punishment cannot be known from the latter 
contitutio. According to Memmer, the fact that in 442 a person who exposed his child was 
certainly not sentenced to death yet is confirmed by the proof that the tenth canon of the 
Concilium Vasense held in the same year dealt with ecclesiastical punishment of those who 
exposed their children.146 Namely, if a regulation imposing death penalty on exposition had 
existed, then the discussion of ecclesiastical punishment would have become completely 
unnecessary.147 The prohibition of exposition of children of 374 presumably applied to the 
pater familias’s own children only because this law also regulated the dominus’s rights over 
the exposed colonus and slave child.148 Based thereon the dominus or the patronus who meant 
the child to die and for this reason exposed it wasnot entitled to the right of reclaiming it. In 
412, emperors Honorius and Theodosius entered a similar regulation into force.149 Compared 
to the previous regulation, it appears as a new elem nt that the regulation makes admitting the 
child subject to meeting two conditions: it had to take place before the bishop and a document 
had to be made thereon. According to Memmer, this makes it probable that the collector had 
the right in accordance with the norm of 331 to deci  the status of the child.150 
In accordance with Iustinianus’s regulation of 529 covering the entire empire, it was 
prohibited to sink the exposed child to the fate of c lonus or slave, no matter what s atus he 
                                                                                                                                                        
voluerit agitare, hoc est sive filium sive servum eum esse maluerit: omni repetitonis inquietudine penitus 
submovenda eorum qui servos aut liberos scientes propria voluntate domo recens natos abiecerint. 
142 Memmer 1991. p. 65. 
143 CTh. 9, 14, 1; C. 9, 16, 8. Si quis necandi infantis piaculum adgressus adgressave sit, sciat se capitali 
supplicio esse puniendum. 
144 C. 8, 51 (52), 2. pr. Unusque subolem suam nutriat. Quid si exponendam putaveri, animadversioni quae 
costituta est subiacebit. 
145 Bonfante 1925. p. 112; Kaser 1971. p. 79. 
146 Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio. Ed. Mansi. Graz 1960. VI. 455. Sane si quies post hac 
diligentissimam sanctionem expositorum hoc ordine colle torum repetitor vel calumniator extiterit, ut homicida 
ecclesiastica distinctione feiatur. 
147 Memmer 1991. p. 70. 
148 C. 8, 51 (52), 2, 1. Sed nec dominis vel patronis repetendi aditum relinqiumus, si ab ipsis expositos 
quodammodo ad mortem voluntas misericordiae amica collegerit: nec enim dicere suum poterit, quem 
pereuntem contempsit. 
149 CTh. 5, 9, 2. Nullum dominis vel patronis repetendi aditum relinqiumus, si expositos quodammodo ad mortem 
voluntas misericordiae amica collegerit: nec enim dicere suum poterit, quem pereuntem contempsit; si modo 
testis episcopalis subscriptio fuerit subsecuta, de qua nulla penitus ad securitatem possit esse cunctatio. 
150 Memmer 1991. p. 70. 
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was from.151 So, it ensured freedom to all exposed children, even to slave children who were 
caused to be exposed by the dominus. It forbids the collector to gain advantage from bringing 
up the child; his act is deemed officium pietatis.152 He confirmed the provisions set forth in 
this regulation in the same year.153 In 541, he expressis verbis guaranteed the freedom of 
exposed children too154, and he allowed the dominus to prove his ownership over the child 
only in the event that the child had been exposed without him being aware of it or in spite of 
his will. 
 
Coming to the end of this analysis, it is necessary to add a few remarks in summary on the 
two legal institutions of patria potestas, discussed in this paper. Ius vitae ac necis, that is, the 
punitive power of pater familias against an adult child meant a right that actually existed until 
the 4th c. A.D., based on which the father himself could ki l his children. The exercise of this 
right, however, was confined to meeting certain rules of procedure and limits. Consequently, 
he had to conduct the proceedings within the frameworks of iudicium domesticum, in which 
the consilium necessariorum investigated the charge and heard the defence of the accused, 
and, then, in the event that the offence seemed to be a crime that deserved death penalty 
indeed, it decided guilt by majority of the votes cast, which decision had absolutely binding 
force upon the pater familias. By lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, Augustus further 
narrowed the scope of application of ius vitae ac necis. Ius exponendi, that is, the right of the 
pater familias over the newborn infant was a living legal institution also in practice until 374 
A.D. Two sides of its exercise are distinguished. One of them is basically ecclesiastical, in 
this case the exposition of the child as procuratio prodigii was aimed at the child’s death and 
was not separated from killing the newborn infant. I  the other case the reason was merely 
that the family or the pater familias did not want to bring up the child; yet, they could reckon 
that somebody would find and bring up the child. If the latter opportunity occurred, then the 
issue of the status of the brought up child arose as a question. During the centuries this 
showed rather variable picture until the law of theage of Iustinian reached the stage where it 
ensured free status to almost all exposed and brought up children. 
 
                                                 
151 C. 8, 51 (52), 3. pr. 1. Sancimus nemini licere, sive ab ingenuis genitoribus p er parvulus procreatus sive a 
libertina progenie sive servlili condicione maculatus expositus sit, eum puerum in suum dominium vindicare sive 
nomine dominii sive adscripticiae cive colonariae condicionis: sed neque his, qui eos nutriendos sustulerunt, 
licentiam concedi penitus (cum quadam distintione) eos tollere et educationem eorum procurare, sive masculi 
sint sive feminae, ut eos vel loco servorum aut colonorum aut adcsripticiorum habeant. Sed nullo discrimine 
habito hi, qui ab huiusmodi hominibus educati sunt, liberi et ingernui appareant et sibi adquirant et in
posteritatem suam vel extranenos heredes omnia quae habi rint, quomodo voluerint, transmittant, nulla macula 
vel servitutis vel adscripticiae aut colonariae condicionis imbuti: nec quasi patronatus iura in rebus eorum 
concedi, sed in omnen terram, quae Romanae dicioni supposita est, haec obtinere. 
152 C. 8, 51 (52), 3, 2. Neque enim oportet eos, qui ab initio infantes abegerunt et mortis forte spem circa eos 
habuerunt, incertos constitutos, si qui eos susceperunt, hos iterum ad se revocare conari et servlili necessitati 
subiugare: neque hi, qui eos pietatis ratione suadente sustulerunt, ferendi sunt snuo suam mutatnes sententiam et 
in servitutem eos retrahentes, licet ab inito huiumodi cogitationem habentes ad hoc prosiluerint, ne videantur 
quasi mercimonio contracto ita pietatis officium gerer . 
153 C. 1, 4, 24. 
154 N. 153, 1. Quicunque igitur in ecclesiis, vel vicis, vel aliis locis expositi probantur, eos omnibus modis liberos 
esse iubemus, licet actori manifesta probatio suppetat, qua personam illam ad suum dominium pertinere 
ostendat. Se enim legibus nostris praeceptum est, ut servi aegrotantes, qui a dominis neglecti, quum de 
valetudine eorum desperarent, tamquam cura a dominis digni non habiti omnino in libertatem rapiantur, quanto 
magis eos, qui in ipso vitae initio aliorum hominum pietati relicti, et ab ipsis enutriti sunt, in iniustam servitutem 
trahi non patiemur? His igitur et sanctissimum Thessalonicensium archiepiscopum et sanctam dei ecclesiam, 
quae sub illo constituta est, et gloriam tuam opem f rre, libertatemque illis adiudicare sancimus. Nequ  illi, qui 
haec faciunt, legum nostrarum poenas effugient, ut qui omni inhumanitate et crudelitate repleti sunt, domnique 
homicido tanto deteriore, quanto miserioribus id afferunt. 
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